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economy demands a more sophisticated system of regulation than the onevalue approach developed in 1890. Such a system must account for differences
in the competing theories of economics as well as for the expanded social
role now required of our economy.'s The task is not a proper one for the
courts. Congress should take note of the Topco Court's request for legislation.
JOHN

D.

MILTON, JR.

LANDLORD TENANT LAW: PLOTTING THE DEATH OF A
SUMMARY PROCEEDING STATUTE-A TEST
FOR RIPENESS
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)
Appellants, month-to-month tenants, refused to pay their rent unless
certain substandard conditions, were remedied. Appellee landlord threatened
eviction under the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute
(FED) .2 Appellants filed a class action in federal district court seeking both
3
a declaratory judgment that this statute was unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement. The district court found the statute did not on
its face violate the Constitution. 4 On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed in
part,5 reversed in part,6 and HELD, the statutory limitation of triable issues
to the tenant's non-payment of rent, which barred all defenses based on landlord's breach of duty, was not repugnant to the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.7
78. For analysis of the potential roles for antitrust policy see articles noted in Halverson,
Bibliography of Current Articles of Interest to Antitrust Lawyers and Economists, 15
ANTITRUsT BULL. 603 (1970).
1. 405 U.S. 56, 58 (1972). On November 10, 1969, the city bureau of building declared
the dwellings in violation of many sections of the Portland Housing Code, and the inspector
posted a notice that the dwelling was required to be vacated within 30 days. The appellants had paid rent for November but refused to pay the December rent until the code
violations were remedied.
2. ORE. REV. STAT. §§105.105-.106 (1971).
3. 405 U.S. at 56. This attack was focused on three elements of the statute: (1) the
requirement of trial no later than 6 days after service of complaint unless security for
accruing rent is provided; (2) the limitation of triable issues to the tenant's default, which
precluded defenses based on landlord's breach of covenant to maintain premises; and (3)
the requirement of posting bond on appeal, with two sureties, in twice the amount of
rent expected to accrue pending the appellate decision, said bond to be forfeited upon
affirmation of the decision.
4. Id. at 62.
5. id. at 64. The provision for trial within 6 days of service of complaint was upheld
as constitutional (Douglas & Brennan, JJ. dissenting).
6. Id at 74. The double bond prerequisite for appealing FED decisions violated the
Equal Protection Clause, and the lower court decision was reversed on this issue.
7. Justice Douglas dissented on this issue; Justice Brennan would have remanded the
case for further interpretation of Oregon law. Id. at 92.
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The historical s basis of landlord-tenant law rested upon the common law
rule of caveat emptor.9 This rule was denominated by two central principles.
First, an owner of property was under no duty to make repairs 0 and second,
lease covenants were deemed independent."' Thus, a substantial breach of a
lease covenant by the landlord would not discharge the tenant from his responsibility to pay rent.' 2 In order to eliminate tenement health and fire
hazards caused by these common law principles, state legislatures and city
governments began in the late nineteenth century to impose certain statutory duties upon the landlord. 3
The housing statutes, however, were generally ineffective because of inadequate enforcement.' 4 Furthermore, even when enforced the provisions constituted an extra business cost rather than an incentive for tenement improvements.' 6 Thus, despite enactment of these codes, tenants continued to live
in uninhabitable premises.' 7 Individual efforts by the tenant to apply pressure
on the landlord generally led to termination of his right to possession through
either common law ejectment 8 or more dramatically through the landlord's
exercise of self-help.' 9
Implementation of the landlord's right of self-help was fraught with

8. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
9. 1 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §99 (3d ed. 1939).
10. Id. §103; see, e.g., Hughes v. Westchester Dev. Corp., 77 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1935);
First Nat'l Realty Corp. v. Oliver, 134 A.2d 325 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1957); Horstman v.
Newman, 291 S.W.2d 567 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956); Schenk v. Lamp, 229 Ore. 72, 365 P.2d
1068 (1961).
11. See, e.g., Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal. App. 2d 54, 179 P-2d 41 (Ist Dist. 1947); Hyde v.
Brandler, 118 A.2d 398 (D.C. Mun. CL App. 1955).
12. 1 AMEmCAN Low OF PROPERTY §3.79 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
13. Wood, The Development, Objective and Adequacy of Current Housing Code Standards, in HOUSING CODE STANDARDS: THREE CRITICAL STUDIES 1 (National Comm'n on Urban
Problems Research Rep. No. 19 (1969)); Daniels, Judicial & Legislative Remedies for Substandard Housing: Landlord-Tenant Law Reform in the District of Columbia, 59 GEo. L.J.
909, 922 (1971).
14. F. Grad, Legal Remedies for Housing Code Violations, in HOUSING CODE STANDARDS:

THREE

CRITICAL STUDIEs

112 (National Comm'n on Urban Problems Research Rep. No. 14

.

(1968)); Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the
Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FoRDAm L. REv. 225 (1969).

15.

For an analysis of enforcement problems in Denver, Colo. see Comment, Housing

for the Poor: A Study of the Landlord-Tenant Relationships, 41 U. COLO. L. REv. 541, 542-

50 (1969).
16. The average fine per case in New York City in 1965 was estimated to be $16.
P. WAmn, LAw AND POVERTY 14 (1965). It has been remarked that these fines carry all the
moral opprobrium of a traffic ticket. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 14, at 241.
17. Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real Property, 66 CoLum. L.
Rrv. 275, 276 (1966).
18. This was a relatively slow, fairly complex, and substantially expensive procedure.

A.

CASNER & W. LEACH, PROPERTY

451 (2d ed. 1969).

19. The landlord-tenant relationship was one of the few areas where the right of selfhelp was recognized by the common law of most states. See Annot., 45 A.L.R. 313 (1926);
Annot., 101 A.L.R. 476 (1936); Annot., 6 A.L.R. 3d 177 (1966).
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violence, quarrels, and bloodshed. 20 The necessity of preventing such breaches
of the peace motivated state legislatures to enact forcible entry and wrongful
detainer statutes. 21 These statutes delineated judicially supervised proceedings
to expeditiously and peacefully resolve possessory disputes. The courts have
22
given their blessings to these statutes because of their salutary objectives.
To achieve the desired speedy determination of the right to possession,
legislatures expressly limited the triable issues in these actions. 23 Consequently, the FED's placed the tenant in a dilemma: if he reported violations
of housing ordinances the landlord could terminate his lease and give him
notice to leave; 24 if he elected to repair and deduct his costs from the rent
he could be evicted through summary FED proceedings for not paying in
full; and, if he withheld rent in an effort to make the landlord repair the
premises he could be ousted under the summary proceedings of the FED
action.25

The source of the tenant's dilemma was that the FED's did not allow
him to raise any defenses in these summary proceedings other than payment.
By eliminating other defenses the summary proceedings ensured that the
common law doctrine of independence of covenants would continue to operate
in landlord-tenant law. The operation of this doctrine, in essence, defeated
26
the legislative intent of the housing codes.
To avoid frustration of the intent of these housing codes, some courts
sought novel approaches to modernize landlord-tenant law. 27 The principal
approach to modernization was the application of contract principles to leases,
which resulted in the landlord-tenant covenants being treated as dependent
rather than independent. One result was the landmark decision of Javins v.
First National Realty Corp.,25 which established the warranty of habitability
in housing.29 Moreover, courts began to declare that the legislative intent of
20. See, e.g., Entelman v. Hagood, 95 Ga. 390, 392, 22 S.E. 345, 347 (1895); Smith v.
Reeder, 21 Ore. 541, 546, 28 P. 890, 891 (1892).
21. These statutes were patterned after those making subversion of possession by actual
force a crime during the reign of Richard II in England. See Beddall v. Maitland, L.R., 17
Ch. Div. 174 (1881). However, the subversion was made a civil wrong rather than a crime
in the states enacting FED statutes. See Goffin v. McCall, 91 Fla. 514, 108 So. 556 (1926);
Taylor v. Scott, 10 Ore. 483 (1883).
22. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
23. In most instances the statutes limit the issue to whether rent is due. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. §83.05 (1971).

24. See, e.g., Safer v. Jacksonville, 237 So. 2d 8 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Wilkins v.
Tebbets, 216 So. 2d 477 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
25. See, e.g., Richard Paul, Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C.
1945); Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal. App. 2d 54, 179 P.2d 41 (1st Dist. 1947).
26. Independence of covenants has been the greatest obstacle in the modernization of
landlord-tenant law. See generally Note, The California Lease- Contract or Conveyance?, 4
STAN. L. REv. 244 (1952).
27. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 595, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1961).
28. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
29. Note, Judicial Expansion of Tenant's Private Law Rights: Implied Warranties of
Habitability and Safety in Residential Urban Leases, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 489 (1971);
Comment, Landlord-Tenant Law: Implied Warranty of Habitability in Residential Leases-
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housing codes would no longer be nullified by use of the FED statutes.30
While tenants in various jurisdictions continued the struggle from footholds gained,31 the appellants in the instant case contended that the FED's
limitation of triable issues to payment of rent violated constitutional due
process. However, the Supreme Court stated that the Constitution did not
forbid states from treating the undertakings of tenant and landlord as independent rather than dependent. 3 - The Court reinforced this position by dedaring the Constitution neither provided judicial remedies for every social
and economic ill nor guaranteed access to dwellings of a particular quality.3 3
Although the Court did not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and
sanitary housing3 the position of the tenant in his struggle for such accommodations 5 has clearly been thwarted because the Court failed to reach the
crucial underlying issues present in the instant case.
The Court upheld the FED statute as affording due process because all
"available" defenses could be raised, notwithstanding the fact that the
available defenses were expressly delineated by the statutes. 3 While focusing
its attention on the availability of these enumerated defenses, the Court
ignored the threshold due process consideration of defenses that the state
had excluded by statute. Due process requires that an opportunity be avail-

A Defense to Landlord Eviction Actions, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 785 (1971).

30. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969); Note, Retaliatory Eviction as a Defense to Unlawful Detainer-Alternative Approaches?, 22 HASTINGS L. R v. 1365 (1971). See also Brownlee v. Sussman, 238 So. 2d 317

(3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (an example of the illogical and rigid approach of Florida law).
31. For an over-all picture of the present state of landlord-tenant law see Comment,
Landlord and Tenant-Implied Warranty of Habitability-Demise
Doctrine of Caveat Emptor, 20 DEPA U L. R.v. 955 (1971).

of the Traditional

32. Due process was not violated by the FED statutes because there was no indication
of exclusion of any defenses recognized as "available" on the triable issue. However, an
exclusion was nevertheless effected by limiting the available defenses. Justice Douglas dissented strongly, noting that Oregon treats a lease as a contract. He stated if due process
is to have any meaning all contract-type defenses must be available in FED actions. 405
U.S. at 88-89. Thus, independence of covenants cannot be allowed without violating the
constitutional guarantees. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-06 (1963).
33. "Absent Constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the
definition of landlord-tenant relationships is a legislative not a judicial function." 405 U.S.

56, 74 (1972).
34. Id. at 88. The Court cited with approval recent advances in the area of tenant's
rights. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969);
Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1968); Earl Milmlken, Inc.
v. Allen, 21 Wis. 2d 497, 124 N.W.2d 651 (1963); Comment, Rent Withholding and
the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53 CAznn'. L. Rev. 304 (1965).
35. See generally Comment, supra note 31; Comment, Frontier Challenge to Urban
Land Owner: Squatters in New York, 49 J. URBAN LAw 323 (1971); Comment, Plotting the
Long-Overdue Death of Caveat Emptor in Leased Housing, 6 U. SAN FRANCIsco L. REv. 147

(1971).
36. 405 U.S. at 69. Even though the lease was treated as a contract by Oregon, the
decision allowed Oregon to define the "available" defenses without regard to the type of
action being litigated.
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able to present all defenses to the type of action being brought.3 7 Hence, it
would appear there must be limits upon the state's power to exclude defenses from those available in the litigation. The anomaly of the Court's
view of these available defenses is only accentuated when a lease is regarded
as a contract.
The Court also implied that housing did not fall into the "fundamental
interest" area,3 8 notwithstanding the expression of the opposite view in recent
civil rights cases. 39 An explanation of this paradoxical stand is necessary for
the tenant to understand the extent to which due process will be expanded
in housing cases. The more embracing due process is, the greater becomes
the limitation imposed on the state with respect to its delineation of available defenses. 40
While circumventing vital issues in the instant case, the Court did
enumerate criteria for testing the ripeness of constitutional issues raised by a
landlord-tenant summary proceeding statute.41 Justice Brennan stated that
the constitutional issue 42 - whether the fourteenth amendment's Due Process
Clause will be violated if a state's substantive law recognizes certain tenant's
rights in some instances, but its procedural law does not permit assertion of
those rights as defenses in a FED-type action - would be ripe for decision
only if state law: (1) recognized substantive rights of the tenant based on the
landlord's breach of duty; (2) recognized because of such breach that a tenant
may remain in possession while withholding rent during the term or may
hold over after expiration of the term; and (3) excludes the assertion of these
rights to continued possession as a defense to a FED-type action.4 3 These
criteria determine whether a particular state statute in the landlord-tenant
area may be subject to constitutional attack.
Florida courts, for example, have repeatedly held that an action brought
to oust a tenant for failure to pay rent under the Delinquent Tenant Act 4 4

37. Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396 (1934); American Surety Co. v. Baldwin,
287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932).
38. The Court applied the "relevant to achievement of state's purposes" test rather
than the "compelling state interest" test, which is usually applied when fundamental
interests are affected. 405 U.S. at 73. See Developments in the Law -Equal Protection, 82
HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
39. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See also Note, The
"New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARv. L. Rzv. 1294, 1310 (1969).
40. See Note, supra note 39, at 1310. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969), where the Supreme Court implied that the fundamental fairness requirement of due
process expands when unique rights are involved in the same manner that the requirements
of equal protection become more stringent when a fundamental right is involved. The
implication made by the Court was that due process becomes more embracing when fundamental rights are affected.
41. Justice Brennan felt Oregon law needed clarification and he set forth the ripeness
requirements, which when met would indicate that the law was clear enough for ruling
upon its constitutionality. 405 U.S. 56, 91 (1972).

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. FLA.

STAT.

§83.05 (1971). "If any person leasing or rerenting any land or house fails
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is a completely different and independent action from those existing under
the FED statutes45 for unlawful detainer. 0 The Delinquent Tenant Act is
customarily used when a tenant attempts to withhold rent because of a
landlord's breach of covenant. 47 The landlord may not use force or enter
without the tenant's permission, 48 but must initiate court action under the
statute's summary proceeding clause. 49 However, the only question to be
determined in this summary proceeding is whether any rent is due.50
"Due process requires that there be an opportunity to present every available defense."' 1 Since Florida treats a lease as a contract 52 it would appear the
exclusion of all contract-type defenses53 from contract disputes litigated under
the Delinquent Tenant Act would be a violation of due process.5 4 But the
Court's refusal to decide this crucial issue in the instant case leaves this area
uncertain.
Florida recognizes the substantive rights of the tenant stemming from the
landlord's breach of duty.5" Consequently, a tenant may remain in possession

to pay the rent at the time it becomes due, the lessor may immediately thereafter enter and
take possession of the property so leased or rented."
45.

FLA. STAT. ch. 82

(1971).

46. State ex rel. Rich v. Ward, 135 Fla. 885, 185 So. 846 (1939); Ex parte Bienville Inv.
Co., 102 Fla. 524, 136 So. 328 (1931).
47. For a discussion showing the uncertainty in this area and overlap between the
landlord-tenant statutes (FLA. STAT. ch. 83 (1971) and the FED Statutes FLA. STAT. ch. 82
(1971)) see Barnett, When the Landlord Resorts to Self-Help: A Plea for Clarification of
the Law in Florida, 19 U. FLA. L. Rav. 238 (1966); Boyer & Grable, Reform of LandlordTenant Statutes To Eliminate Self-Help in Evicting Tenants, 22 MIAmi L. RLy. 800 (1968).

48. See Ardell v. Milner, 166 So. 2d 714 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964). FLA. STAT. §83.05 (1971)
did not protect landlord from recovery of lost profits as damages by dentist-tenant when
landlord changed locks on office door after refusal of dentist to pay rent until air conditioner
was repaired.
49. FLA. STAT. §§83.20-.26 (1971).

50. Masser v. London Operating Co., 106 Fla. 474, 145 So. 79 (1933); Brownlee v.
Sussman, 238 So. 2d 317 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
51. Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396 (1934); American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287
U.S. 156, 168 (1932).
52. See, e.g., Morris v. Knox Corp., 153 Fla. 130, 13 So. 2d 914 (1943); Alexander v.
Bess, 123 Fla. 713, 167 So. 533 (1936); Griffing Bros. Co. v. Winfield, 53 Fla. 589, 43 So.
687 (1907).
53. The only triable issue is whether rent is due. See Nevins Drug Co. v. Bunch, 63
So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1953); Brownlee v. Sussman, 238 So. 2d 317 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
54. In Brownlee v. Sussman, 238 So. 2d 317, 319 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970), Justice Carroll,
dissenting, stated: "I regard it as a denial of due process of law, in an action by a landlord
to recover possession from a tenant for nonpayment of rent, for the defendant to be denied
the right to plead and establish a valid defense he may have (other than the defense of
payment)."
55. Florida recognizes substantive tenant rights under two circumstances: breach of
covenant of quiet enjoyment by landlord, Hankins v. Smith, 103 Fla. 892, 138 So. 494
(1931); Richards v. Dodge, 150 So. 2d 477 (2d D.C.A. Ila. 1963); Berwick Corp. v. Kleinginna
Inv. Corp., 143 So. 2d 684 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962) and breach of an express covenant by
the landlord. See Masser v. London Operating Co., 106 Fla. 474, 145 So. 72 (1933).
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while withholding rent during the term or may hold over after expiration of
the term.56 Florida also excludes the assertion of these rights to continued
possession in the summary proceeding.5 7 Thus, Florida law appears to meet
the criteria set up by Justice Brennan for testing the constitutionality of the
Delinquent Tenant Act.
The instant case may have particular significance in Florida because it
exposes a Florida statute to constitutional attack. Furthermore, the Florida
question is framed so that, if raised, the Court would not again be able to
circumvent the real issue. In view of the apparent ripeness for challenge, the
Florida Legislature should revise the statute, thus avoiding probable litigation and bringing the state in accord with those enlightened jurisdictions-8
that recognize that landlord-tenant law should be brought out of the feudal
era and into the twentieth century.
JOSEPH

W. BEASLEY

56. Florida has in effect recognized the right of the tenant to continue occupying the
premises after the breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment and later receive an abatement of
rent. See, e.g., Carner v. Shapiro, 106 So. 2d 87 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968). Tenant was awarded
damages, which were in effect an abatement of rent, even though he failed to abandon
premises when the landlord breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment; McCloskey v. Martin,
56 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1951) (abatement of rent granted tenant for breach of covenant of
quiet enjoyment).
57. FLA. STAT. §§83.20 et seq. (1971) (only issue triable is whether any rent is due).
See Masser v. London Operating Co., 106 Fla. 474, 145 So. 72 (1933).
58. See, e.g., Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Javins v.
First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970);
Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Los Angeles County Sup.
Ct. 1967); Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969);
Lemlee v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50
Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Schiro v. W. E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 165 N.E.2d
286 (1960); Kline v. Burns, Ill N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J.
130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Berzito v. Gambino, 114 N.J. Super. 124, 274 A.2d 865 (1971);
Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970); Dickhut v. Norton,
45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
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